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The Executive Power In State
And Federal Constitutions
By WILLIM F. SWINDLER*
The Historical Background
W ATERGATE, in 1973, dramatized inter alia the haziness of federal
constitutional law on the subject of the powers and functions of the
executive branch. It accordingly invited revisitation of the theoretical
and practical circumstances out of which the office itself evolved, both
at the presidential level and in the gubernatorial articles of state consti-
tutions which were antecedent to Article 11.1 Such a review of a sub-
ject so long taken for granted not only reveals certain parallels but
also certain contrasts.2
Tresidential power, in general, is less an outgrowth of specific
constitutional provisions than a product of necessity and opportunity,
augmented by the forcefulness of the personality of the occupant of
the White House. Gubernatorial power, as will be indicated below,
has emerged to its present portions more in terms of extraneous politi-
cal and economic trends, in spite of an abundance of specific restraints
written into the constitutional instruments. To the revolutionary and
post-revolutionary generation, the concept of a strong central authority
vested in a single chief executive seemed to be fundamentally dan-
gerous; the colonial experience with arbitrary royal governors prompt-
ed the first state constitution makers to limit and divide the authority
of the executive branch. But the alternative, of no executive author-
* Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. Author COURT AND CONsTrrTUmoN T Hn 20TH CNrtURY (3 vol. 1969, 1970,
1974).
1. U.S. CONsT. art. IL
2. See generally 2 B. ScwARTz, PowRs OF GovERNMENT ch. 9 (1963); R.
NEUSTADT, PRESmENTIAL PowR (1960); C. RossrrER, THE AmERICAN PRSMIDENCY
(1956). On the subject of the state office, see generally C. RANsoNE, OFMCE OF THE
GOVERNOR (1956); L. LipsoN, THE AMEm AN GOVERNOR FROM FIGUREHEAD TO LEADER
(1939).
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ity at all, had been disastrously demonstrated in the national govern-
ment attempted by the Articles of Confederation; thus, the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787 came to Philadelphia prepared to find a
middle ground.
"There is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vig-
orous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican govern-
ment," Alexander Hamilton conceded, but he refuted this idea with an
oft-quoted declaration: "A feeble executive implies a feeble execu-
tion of a government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for
a bad execution. And a government ill executed, whatever it may
be in theory, must be in practice a bad government."' 3  Hamilton's
own plan for an executive article for the new federal Constitution,
taken largely from the New York Constitution of 1777, would have
expressed a more affirmative catalog of powers. The New York Con-
stitution, in any case, became the model for much of what the Phila-
delphia Convention eventually incorporated into Article II.4 The
primary consideration, consistent with Jeffersonian thought, was to in-
sure legislative checks upon the executive; one of the fundamental
"rights of Englishmen" for which the War of Independence had been
fought was the control of the crown by Parliament.5
While the legislative checks and balances vis-h-vis the state ex-
ecutive had been written into most of the constitutions of the erstwhile
colonies turned states, the first half century of experience with
unchecked legislative power wrought substantial changes in constitu-
tional theory. State assemblies proved all too susceptible to blandish-
ments and even briberies, of the forces behind land company promo-
tions, wildcat banks, and canal building, part of the panacea called
"internal improvements."6  In many of the new, trans-Alleghany
states by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, these
depredations had brought many governments to the brink of bankrupt-
cy. A new wave of constitution making set in, in which a dominant
theme was the strengthening of a responsible executive office and a
stricter circumscription of the legislative branch.7
3. ThE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 451 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
4. 3 M. FARRAND, Tim REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONSTIUONAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, 625-27 (1937).
5. See CONSTITUTIONAL DocUMENTS OF THE AmERICAN REVOLUTION (W. Swind-
ler ed. 1974).
6. See generally B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF THm PUBLIC LAND'r Poucms (1924).
7. Cf. B. RIcH, STATE CONSTnmONS: THE GOVERNOR ch. 1 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as RicH]. This work is one of a series of state constitutional studies prepared
by the National Municipal League, the sponIors of the Model State Constitution (See
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In the White House, executives like Jefferson with his initiative
in authorizing the Louisiana Purchase (over his own constitution-
al doubts) and Andrew Jackson with his readiness to challenge Con-
gress itself on the issue of the Second Bank of the United States, es-
tablished precedents of authority within the generalities of the lan-
guage of Article H1. While succeeding nineteenth century presidents
and the vagaries of Reconstruction politics left a vacuum filled by an
aggressive Congress, a revival of the executive authority began with
the Square Deal of Theodore Roosevelt and the progressive move-
ment climaxing in the New Freedom of Woodrow Wilson. The mas-
sive shift of power to the executive branch and centralized government
which characterized the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt set the
course for strong and independent presidential authority which has
continued to the present.'
The post-Civil War period generated the forces which encour-
aged the development of greater executive strength in the states al-
most a generation before the twentieth century presidential assertions
of the first Roosevelt and Wilson. It has been pointed out that the
administrative agencies in the government of New York grew from
ten in 1800 to eighty-one in 1900 (and to 170 by 1925);10 but the
emergence of the modem administrative regulatory agency and its val-
idation is marked by Munn v. Illinois,"' dating from 1877. The Illi-
nois Constitution of 1870, which created the state warehouse and grain
elevator commission, one of the catalysts of -the "Granger cases",12
marked the next phase in state constitutional development. At the
same time it planted a seed which grew into the concept of the divided
executive function which has, as it has turned out, inhibited the effec-
tive growth of efficient executive power. The divided executive of
the earlier constitutional period-exemplified in the independently
elected offices of attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, audi-
tor, and state superintendent of education in many instances-was still
note 30 infra). The League has also commissioned numerous monographs on the state
constitutional problems; e.g., A. STum, TkiRTY YEARS OF STATE CONSTTMON-
MAKiNG, 1938-1968 (1970).
8. See 2 N. ScHAcmERr, THO AS JEFFERSON 721-26 (1951); M. JAi__s, ANDRw
JACKSON 350-385 (1937).
9. See generally E. LnrDLEY, HALFWAY wrr RoosEvLT (1937).
10. Rich, The Governor as Administrative Head, in SALmN-T IssuES OF CoNsTrru-
TIo AL REvISION ch. 7 (J. Wheeler ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Rich, The Governor as
a Policy Leader].
11. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
12. W. SWINLFR, Trm OLD LEGALriY, 1889-1932, ch. 4 (1969).
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further divided by new constitutional articles establishing the indepen-
dent regulatory commissions.13
Thus the problem of the executive in both state and national
government in the United States in the twentieth century is the fol-
lowing: the presidential office has grown in authority within the all
too vaguely defined contours of Article II while the gubernatorial of-
fice has grown under greater difficulties, primarily under the dual
burdens of divided executive power and a too restrictive definition
of constitutional authority. Obviously, the strong or charismatic indi-
vidual makes a difference in either case-the two Roosevelts and Wil-
son (all of whom had gubernatorial preparation) in the presidency,
men like Charles Evans Hughes of New York, Robert M. LaFol-
lette of Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson of California (all of whom went
on to national office) in the governors' chairs of the progressive era.
But as the federal union approaches the final quarter of the twentieth
century, it becomes increasingly evident that a clearer statement of
constitutional theory of the executive function needs to be articulated.
Executive Power in the 20th Century
If the presidential powers are left largely undefined in the federal
Constitution, and have grown and taken shape through historical ac-
cretion, the executive function in most state constitutional frameworks
has continued to be fairly strictly circumscribed and has developed
by grace of a reluctant easing of judicial construction. A scanning
of decisional law on the subject of the state executive power in general
suggests that the judicial theory is one of agency; the first responsi-
bility of the executive is the faithful implementation of laws which have
been either legislatively enacted or judicially construed.14 The state
executive office is one of stringently limited discretion. There is no
assumption that the executive has any option in determining whether
or how much of a legislative mandate is to be carried out.15  In con-
trast to recent presidential assertions of executive prerogative in this
13. E.g., ALA. CONST. art. XIII; CAL. CONST. art. XII; FLA. CONST. art. XI; ILL.
CONST. art. XI. Cf. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAw chs. 1-3 (1965).
14. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 567, 154 A. 217, 223 (1931);
Posner v. Levitt, 67 Misc. 2d 565, 324 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1971), affd 37 App.
Div. 2d 931, 325 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1971); Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 421-22, 250
A.2d 474, 482, appeal dismissed & cert. denied, 395 U.S. 827 (1969).
15. Loftus v. Department of Agriculture, 211 Iowa 566, 569, 232 N.W. 412, 414-
15 (1930), appeal dismissed, 283 U.S. 809 (1931); Ball v. Board of Trustees, 251 Md.
685, 693, 248 A.2d 650, 655 (1968). Cf. Strutwear Knitting Co. v. Olson, 13 F. Supp.
384, 390-91 (D. Minn. 1936) (dictum).
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and other relationships, the long-held view of at least one state court
is that prerogative or privilege in a governor does not exist unless ex-
pressed in the constitution. 16
The specific constitutional provisions concerning executive pow-
ers are generally paralleled in both national and state documents. The
appointing and removal powers, the receiving of reports and accounts
from other officers of the government and the reporting of the state
of affairs to the legislative branch, pardons and reprieves for offenders
against the laws of the jurisdiction, and the representation of the gov-
ernment in its relations with other sovereignties (with other states or
the federal government in the case of governors, with foreign states
and international organizations in the case of the president) are among
those parallel provisions.
The vast freedom of action granted to the president in the field
of foreign affairs' 7 would make the national executive office more
powerful than any state counterpart, even if no other obvious differ-
ences were manifested. In domestic affairs, however, the authority
of both national and state executives has been circumscribed by the
courts, although the restraints are more pervasive in the case of gov-
ernors. The Supreme Court holdings in Humphrey's Executor
v. United States;' and in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 9
have been anticipated, to a degree, by opinions such as that of the
Colorado court denying a governor's removal powers over officials con-
firmed by the legislature, from the civil service level to the policymak-
ing level. 20  Analogous holdings in other state jurisdictions may also
be noted.2 1  State executive authority is further constrained by the
judicial doctrine that the authority is limited to express definitions to
be found in the constitution or the statutes of the state. The governor,
in effect, is the agent of the legislature. 2   As the California Supreme
16. Heyward v. Long, 178 S.C. 351, 183 S.E. 145 (1935).
17. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
18. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
19. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
20. Roberts v. People ex rel. licks, 77 Colo. 281, 235 P. 1069 (1925). The
power of the governor of Colorado to remove public officers had been uniformly re-
stricted to the scope of the particular statutes involved. See Trimble v. People ex rel
Phelps, 19 Colo. 187, 34 P. 981 (1893); Lamb v. People ex rel. Jefferds, 3 Colo. App.
106, 32P. 618 (1893).
21. Cf. State ex rel. Yancey v. Hyde, 121 Ind. 20, 22 N.E. 644 (1889); Commis-
sioner v. Kelley, 350 Mass. 501, 215 N.E.2d 653 (1966); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa.
263, 191 A.2d 835 (1963).
22. Cf. Calvert v. Adams, 388 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). State
ex rel. Bennett v. Bonner, 123 Mont. 414, 214 P.2d 747 (1950).
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Court has put it, most of the actions of the executive branch are min-
isterial, and ministerial acts are by definition non-discretionary.23 This
characteristic judicial attitude doubtless accounts for the fact that the
use of executive orders for any but ceremonial purposes, which at the
presidential level were developed by Franklin D. Roosevelt as a means
of lessening dependence upon Congress, 2 4 has not in fact been fol-
lowed by any state executive.25
The specifics of gubernatorial limitation are illustrated in the pro-
visions of various state constitutions. In a dozen or more states, the
executive may not succeed himself. 26  Taking the common denomi-
nators of most of the state charters, the governor's powers and func-
tions may be said to fall into three principal categories: (1) duties
with reference to the legislative process (messages and reports,
approval or veto of bills, calling of extraordinary sessions),27 (2) ap-
pointing and commissioning of state officers, 28 and (3) supervision of
some, although seldom all, of the executive and administrative agen-
cies of the state.29 The narrow judicial interpretation of executive
powers within these categories appears to derive from the-thrust of
the executive article in general. The traditional theory remains one
of circumscribed and explicit powers, and the typical state constitution
tends to distribute the powers among a number of independent of-
fices. Valid as may have been the eighteenth and nineteenth century
aversion to a centralization of authority, the needs of the twentieth
century state are manifestly different. The drafters of the Model State
Constitution,3" accordingly, have concluded:
In keeping with the concept of the governor as leader of state
administration. . . the chief executive is also granted broad
powers which permit him to take the initiative in administrative
reorganization ....
23. See Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 189, 211 (1870). Discretionary acts of
the executive are not justiciable except upon evidence of abuse of authority. Ex parte
Panagopoulos, 3 F. Supp. 222 (S.D. Cal. 1933).
24. See W. Swim'LER, Tim NEw LEGALriY, 1932-1968, 419 (1970).
25. See Note, Gubernatorial Executive Orders as Devices for Administrative Di-
rection and Control, 50 IowA L. Rv. 78 (1964).
26. B. RICH, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
27. Williams v. Kerner, 30 Ill. 2d 11, 195 N.E.2d 680 (1963); Harris v. Shana-
han, 192 Kan. 183, 387 P.2d 771 (1963).
28. Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 191 A.2d 835 (1963).
29. Arizona State Land Dept. v. McFate, 87 Ariz. 139, 348 P.2d 912 (1963);
Morss v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957).
30. The Model State Constitution was first prepared in 1921 and is revised pe-
riodically. It is a composite of provisions taken from various states, with accompany-
ing commentary.
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The governor as responsible head of the administration
should have the unencumbered power to select and, when neces-
sary, remove the heads of all administrative departments. Public
officials at the level of department head are not only administra-
tors but policy makers and should be directly and personally re-
sponsible to the governor.
Arguments are frequently offered that the heads of certain
departments should be directly responsible to the people and
hence independently elected. For example, the argument is often
applied to the attorney general. It is the policy reflected in the
Model, however, that the attorney for a state must be a part of
the chief executive's administrative team, must be ready to serve
as the governor's legal advisor and be subject to the governor's
direction, as is the case in the national government or in any large
industrial or business corporation. To do otherwise, as unfor-
tunately 43 states do, fractionalizes administration unnecessarily
and in a particularly sensitive area of administration. 31
Political considerations being what they are, the reduction in the
number of independent constitutional executive officers would seem
to be a long time in the future. The growth of centripetal administra-
tive processes in the twentieth century has encouraged a kind of co-
ordinating authority in the governorship. While Florida's cabinet sys-
tem is unique among the states,"2 the combination of the governor's
appointing power and his ex-officio membership in administrative
agencies in many instances8 3 has created opportunities for leadership
which have made for greater uniformity of state policy. 34 A new con-
cept, emulative of the national example, 35 of a power of executive
reorganization under the governor was advocated by the Model State
Constitution but was adopted in unequivocal terms only in the 1956
Alaska constitution and the 1971 Illinois constitution.30
Prospects for the Future
The centralizing tendency of the government process as a phe-
nomenon of the twentieth century has contributed to the imbalance
31. MODEL STATE CONST=rrION at 71-72 (Comments to § 5.06, 5.07).
32. McCullom, Florida's Cabinet System-A Critical Analysis, 43 FLA. BJ. 156
(1969).
33. E.g., IA. CONST. art. IV, § 1, art. V, § 11, art. VI, H9 19.1, 30, art. XII,
§ 7, art. XVMI, § 7; N.M. CONsT. art. V, H9 2, 4, art. § 6, OHIO CONsr. art. VifII,
§§ 8, 12; ORE. CONST. art. V, § 16, art. VIII, § 5; Wyo. CoNsT. art. IV, § 7, art.
XVIH, § 3.
34. Cf. language of NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
35. Cf. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, §t 401-08, 47 Stat. 413-15; Act of Mar.
3, 1933, ch. 212, H9 401-09, 47 Stat. 1517-20.
36. MODEL STATE CONSTrrUTON art. V, § 5.06; ALAS. CONST. art. I, § 26; ILL.
CoNsT. art. V, § 2.
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of the separate powers of legislative and executive in favor of the lat-
ter, at the national level, despite the recurrent demands that Congress
reclaim various facets of authority which have been given to the ex-
ecutive branch.17  There is nothing to suggest that a significant shift
back toward legislative supremacy is likely or desirable, at least in re-
spect to national government. The Jeffersonian ideal of the
paramountcy of popularly elected and controlled parliamentary bodies
with accountable ministers of legislative programs-the theory of the
British constitution 3 -has all but vanished from the national scene,
and has been preserved in form at least at the state level by the con-
tinuing distribution or dissipation of executive authority among various
independent offices. For some critics of contemporary state govern-
ment, this is the crux of executive ineffectiveness: "constitutional bar-
riers make larger issues virtually impossible of solution."- 9^
Diffusion of authority, in the view of another student of effective
modern state government, is but the greatest of several basic prob-
lems: the restrictions on gubernatorial terms, both as to length and
succession; constitutionally "frozen" executive procedures; and fiscal
and budgetary controls which are drastically independent of the chief
executive.40  The case for reform and modernization (that is, centrali-
zation) is countered, as still another scholar has put it, by vari-
ous "presures for separatism" which he enumerates as follows: "(1)
a 'normal' drive for agency autonomy, (2) a historical background of
separate responsibility to the electorate, (3) 'reform' movements for
special functions, (4) clientele and interest group attitudes, (5) pro-
fessionalism, (6) functional links to the national government, (7)
a desire to insulate special types of programs, (8) a political division
between legislature and governor, and (9) dissatisfaction with central
political processes."' 41 Most of the factors among these nine speak
for themselves.
What is really being urged upon modern state government is a
definition of executive authority almost entirely in terms of state serv-
37. See generally SEPARATION OF PowERs AND THE INDEPENDEN.T AGENCIES: CASES
AND SFLECTED READINGS, S. Doc. No. 91-40, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) [hereinafter
cited as S. Doc. No. 91-49].
38. H. PHILLIPS, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMiNmSTRATIVE LAW chs. 1-3 (5th ed.
(1973).
39. RICH, supra note 7, at 33.
40. Rich, The Governor as Policy Leader, supra note 10, at 95. Cf. Carley, Le-
gal and Extra-Legal Powers of the Wisconsin Governor in Legislative Relations, 1962
Wis. L. REv. 280.
41. F. HEADY, STATE CONSTrTMONS: THE Sm ucrxnu OF A M IISTRATION 5-6
(1961).
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ices. The modem state executive, as distinguished from the national
executive, would thus become a central administrator and the liaison
officer between the executive/administrative functions and the legis-
lature.42 It is pertinent to observe that modem state government is
principally exemplified by such major services as education, law en-
forcement, transportation, health and welfare, and natural resource
management.4 3  To these may be added the specific regulatory proc-
esses which evolved both from economic hisotry and nineteenth-cen-
tury reaction, for example, utility and corporation regulation, labor re-
lations, and civil service."
The principal need for a better defined executive power in this
context is for central administration of the state administrative process
itself. The type of state executive function which is emerging in the
final quarter of the twentieth century is a component of modem fed-
eralism,5 in which the states are essentially units of local administra-
tion and coordinates of a unified political economy. If this is in fact
the prospect for the future, it is a logical consequence of the centri-
petal trend of modem government on the one hand and of the divided
character of the state executive/administrative process on the other.
The national state, while it is confronted with this same tendency
to merge executive and administrative functions, 46 has preserved the
separate political function of the executive because of the nature of
the national state itself. The president is ultimately distinguishable
from any governor by virtue of his being the chief of state; this is
a function uniquely ascribed to the national executive. Thus, in re-
turning to the constitutional issues involved in the Watergate events,
it may be perceived that inter alia they include a requirement for a
restatement of the federal executive function as distinguished from the
state executive function. This is unlikely to take formal constitutional
shape. Rather, from this experience as from other experiences in our
national history, the dimensions of presidential power will be settled
at limits as broad as the legitimate needs of the government may re-
quire.
42. Cf. J. KiLPATRi, THE SOVEREiGN STATES (1957).
43. E.g., provisions on conservation of natural resources are found in: ALAs.
CONST. art. VIII; HAWAH CONST. art. X; MAss. CONST. art. XLIX; OIo- CONST. art.
II, § 36.
44. A. RicHARDs, The Heritage of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in
THE FiFTn STATES AND THtm LocAL GOVERNMENTS 39 (J. Fesler ed. 1967).
45. Cf. A. Miller, Towards a Concept of Constitutional Duty, 1968 Sup. Or. RE-
vmw 199 (P. Kurland ed. 1969).
46. See generally S. Doc. No. 91-49, supra note 37.

